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Potential effects of Brexit on the Hungarian economy
Direct trade between Hungary and the UK has been quite modest, which means that one 
should not expect a significant impact of Brexit on the Hungarian economy, whatever 
the effect on its volume. The UK’s share in Hungarian exports was 4.3% in 2015, and 
only 1.7% of Hungary’s total imports came from the UK. Hungary has a modest share 
of the UK’s trade – 0.3% of exports, and 0.8% of imports. The main Hungarian export 
products to the UK are nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; 
electrical machinery and equipment; vehicles other than railway or tramway; and optical 
instruments. The main UK export products to Hungary are pharmaceutical products; 
nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical machinery 
and equipment; vehicles other than railway or tramway; and optical instruments.
However, Hungary’s trade-induced losses due to Brexit are estimated to be relatively 
large in spite of these low shares in direct trade, with Breinlich et al. (2016, p. 131) 
estimating the losses at 0.3% of GDP. In relative terms, this is larger than the losses 
for (in decreasing order) the Czech Republic, Sweden, Germany, Poland, Slovakia, 
Finland, France, Portugal, Austria, Romania, Spain, Italy, Slovenia and Greece, but less 
than the losses for Ireland, the rest of EU (smaller countries taken together consisting 
of the Baltics, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Luxemburg, Malta), the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Denmark. The same study estimates that the trade effect on UK GDP will be in the 
range of 1.3% to 2.8%, depending on the scenario. Under an optimistic scenario, the 
UK is assumed to negotiate a Norway-like deal and tariffs remain at zero, but non-tariff 
barriers increase to one quarter of the reducible barriers faced by US exporters to the 
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EU. The authors further assume that the UK will not benefit from additional intra-EU 
integration, through which non-tariff barriers will fall 20% faster than in the rest of the 
world. They also factor in a 17% reduction in the UK’s fiscal contribution to the EU (the 
same as Norway), a saving of 0.09% of UK GDP. Their pessimistic scenario supposes 
that the UK and the EU impose MFN tariffs on each other. Non-tariff barriers increase 
to three-quarters of the reducible barriers faced by US exporters to the EU. Further, the 
UK is excluded from additional EU integration, through which non-tariff barriers are 
assumed to fall 40% faster than in the rest of the world. In this scenario, they assume 
that the UK will save 0.31% of GDP on its fiscal contribution to EU budget. UK exports 
to the EU will fall by between 11% and 31% in the short run, and the long-run effects 
will be larger at somewhere between 25% and 44%. In the two extreme scenarios, EU 
exports to the UK will fall by between 10% and 29% in the short run, and by between 
27% and 38% in the long run.
The second-round effects, however, are more important than the direct effects. They 
come from the fact that Germany is far more important to Hungary than the UK is. 
Germany’s shares of Hungarian trade are 30.3% of exports and 23.5% of imports. (More 
or less the same is true for Slovakia although with somewhat lower trade exposure to 
Germany; countries in a similar position are also exposed to the second-round effects). 
Hungarian trade with Germany is large and may affect UK-German trade. One third of 
German exports to the UK consist of vehicles other than railway or tramway, a product 
group that represents a quarter of Hungarian exports to Germany. Product-level case 
studies might offer some insights into the conversion rate – that is, the extent to which 
Hungarian exports to Germany affect the German exports to the UK. Unfortunately, we 
do not have adequate case studies, but it is highly probable that Hungarian exports to 
Germany do in turn generate German exports to the UK.
Export and import transactions are especially linked to each other when exports and 
imports take place within the same firm or along the same supply chain. This suggests 
that the bulk of the economic effect of Brexit on Hungary via the trade channel may 
come not from the direct trade flow, but rather from second-round effects via Germany. 
If Germany trades less with the UK after Brexit, this will have a larger effect on 
Hungarian welfare than the loss due to the decrease in direct trade between UK and 
Hungary.
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FDI from UK to Hungary has been quite volatile. For example, its share in overall 
inflows was 16% in 2012-2013, but was close to zero in 2014. Up to 2014, the UK’s 
share in the stock of FDI in Hungary was 3.8%. The UK is the seventh largest investor 
in the country, and it mainly invests in the retail, telecommunications and professional 
services sectors. The largest companies in Hungary that are owned either fully or 
partly by UK investors are Tesco, Shell, Unilever, Glencore, Vodafone, Invitel, British 
American Tobacco Hungary, Imperial Tobacco Hungary, Reckitt Benckiser, and 
GlaxoSmithKline.
The UK is the second most popular destination (behind Germany) for Hungarian 
emigrants working abroad. According to official statistics, after Hungary’s EU 
accession, the number was slightly below 40,000 until 2010. In the following six years 
their number increased rapidly, with an annual inflow of more than 20,000 in each 
year. These emigrants are younger, more skilled and more educated than the median 
Hungarian employee or job seeker. More specifically, two subgroups can be identified: 
skilled workers, and employees with a higher education. One quarter of these work in 
hotels and restaurants, and their share is significantly larger than that from other member 
countries joining the EU in 2004 or later. The share of health and social workers among 
Hungarians working in the UK is also significantly higher than for these countries. The 
share of workers in the manufacturing and building industry is lower, however, and is 
very similar to that of the EU15.
A large increase in foreign remittances – reaching 3.2% of Hungarian GDP in 2014 – 
can be explained by this increase in emigration. The UK was the fourth largest source 
country behind Germany, the US and Canada, with around €360 million.
Main elements of Hungary’s strategy for Brexit
It is obvious that Brexit will have non-negligible consequences for Hungary through 
all three channels – trade, labour and capital. Although it may seem that the welfare 
loss due to trade is not significant, it is not its estimated magnitude in itself that should 
generate major concern. Its overall effect may be larger due to second-round channels, 
and this is why the Hungarian negotiating partners should attach high importance to the 
trade chapter.
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Trade and labour movement issues will be linked during negotiation, as there seems to 
be no easy compromise between the positions of the UK and the EU. If the UK prefers a 
free trade agreement (FTA) with discretionary regulation of labour movement from the 
EU, and the EU insists on the Single Market – i.e. an FTA must go hand-in-hand with 
free movement of EU labour – it is hard to foresee a compromise.
Hungary has benefitted from a UK labour market that has welcomed highly skilled 
and highly educated immigrants. The UK labour market holds great value in the eyes 
of Hungarian job seekers abroad, and there is no close substitute in the EU on such a 
scale. It will take some time for potential migrants to react to new rules of entry into 
the UK labour market. However, as the negotiation will last for a while, assuming 
the push factors still dominate, potential migrants will have enough time to acquire 
the skills necessary for an alternative target country. According to the literature on the 
welfare effects of migration on source countries, well-designed domestic policies are 
the appropriate answer to the potential emigration outflow.
If, as can be assumed, the trade and labour markets will be tied to each other in the 
negotiations, two main broad options emerge: free labour movement with a custom 
union, or discretionary labour regulation with tariffs and non-tariff barriers. If the 
‘free’ option is impossible for political reasons, then the negotiations will be over the 
parameters and the conditions of the departure from free trade. The UK seems to have 
a hard stance on labour, but it should be ready to give up much more in terms of free 
trade to achieve discretionary labour measures, as the trade-induced losses are highly 
asymmetrical between the UK and the EU. Any significant departure from free trade 
will be accompanied by new, additional financial market barriers. The above estimations 
do not deal with the effect of increasing frictions in financial flows between the UK and 
the EU – their effect on welfare might be as negative as that of new tariffs and new 
trade barriers. 
A few countries may even see some short-term gain from reduced access to the UK 
labour market, as fewer skilled and highly educated emigrants leave their countries. 
These are mostly countries from the EU8 – especially Bulgaria, Hungary Poland, and 
Romania. However, any short-term welfare gains in the labour market will be exceeded 
by the losses through the trade channel. In addition, the short-term labour market 
gains might not even be realised if the new UK labour regulations do not dampen 
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the emigration push factors in Hungary and in other central and eastern European 
countries. And the short-term effects – if they exist at all – will doubtless evaporate 
in the long run. Therefore, it is important for the Hungarian negotiators to understand 
that their eventual reluctance to join the EU’s hard stance on the trade front will not 
be compensated by the welfare gain on labour. This is why the Hungarian strategy 
should take into account that any concession on labour market regulations will have 
consequences for the trade channel. It should be clear that any bartering over the labour 
market for trade concessions might have a negative overall effect on Hungarian welfare.
The Hungarian long-term interest is to take advantage of trade with UK, be it direct or 
indirect. It follows that Hungary has a strong interest in allying itself with Germany over 
trade. However, the large EU countries will take a hard stance on the potential trade-off 
between trade and labour deviations from the free option. Their initial readiness to swap 
deviations from the free option in trade and labour might be significantly different from 
that of Hungary, which is comparable to that of countries with similar trade and labour 
exposures to UK (such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland). However, if these 
countries together with Hungary make efforts to impose their negotiating position – 
that is, appearing ready to accept the UK’s hard stance on labour – on others, then the 
overall trade-related welfare outcome might be in jeopardy as a harder stance on trade 
will be the unavoidable final outcome. As the final agreement should be unanimously 
voted on, any serious disagreement between the EU15 and the EU8 may provide an 
additional argument in favour of a two-speed EU. 
The Brexit negotiation will be instrumental in the future of the EU, and economic 
considerations will certainly be heavily influenced by more general issues on the EU 
agenda. Hopefully it will become clear to the participating countries that disintegration 
would be costly, and that significant welfare losses are unavoidable. It may serve as a 
disciplinary device to deter other countries from even considering exit.
What is required?
According to the UK’s Department for International Trade, the benefits for UK businesses 
exporting to Hungary include English being accepted as a business language, a western-
style business culture, over £28 billion EU funding between 2014 and 2020, and the 
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UK ‘brand’ being viewed positively. The strengths of the Hungarian market include 
its strategic location in the heart of Europe, a well-developed transport network, an 
open economy, good infrastructure and communications, and its investment incentives. 
Hungary ranks 54th in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report, but the report 
places Hungary 110th in terms of protecting investors. Despite Hungary’s increasingly 
westernised business culture, UK companies can encounter difficulties there, including 
bureaucracy, corruption, language difficulties (especially for smaller companies and 
outside Budapest) and legal barriers in public procurement. Obviously, these difficulties 
have nothing to do with Brexit and their removal should have a positive effect on both 
trade and FDI with all countries.
Whatever the final outcome of the UK-EU negotiations, Hungary will surely remain 
popular among British stag parties and ‘ruin bar’ visitors, and Hungarian dentistry 
services will still be used extensively by British patients. Whatever the overall impact 
of this on Hungarian welfare, however, it will not compensate for the potential loss 
from falling UK-EU trade.
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